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NOTE ON INDEXING TO REPORTER TRANSCRIPTS 
Citations in this brief to the record in 
the court below are as follows: i 
R. Record on Appeal 
Tr. Transcript of Testimony of hearing held on 
January 27, 1976, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist 4 
Tp. Transcript of Proceedings of hearing held on 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No, 
~vs- : 14485 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County upon an information alleging a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1953), as amended, in 
that he "distributed a controlled substance for value, to-wit: 
Marijuana," 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried in the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Weber County, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, sitting without a jury. Appellant was found not 
guilty of distributing a controlled substance for value as 
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charged, but was found guilty of a lesser included offense, 
distributing a controlled substance not for value. Appellant 
was sentenced upon the above stated conviction. It is from 
that verdict and judgment that appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 29, 1974, Officer L. J. Call, an 
Ogden Police Department undercover agent, purchased marijuana 
from one Farhad Soroushirn, identified as the defendant by 
Officer Call (Tr.35,37). Officer Call was accompanied by and 
led to defendant's apartment by a black college student, 
Terrell Eady (Tr.41). On this occasion, Officer Call, Terrell 
Eady and the defendant went to an Ogden residence where 
marijuana was obtained through the defendant Soroushirnfs 
contact (Tr.42). On this occasion, Terrell Eady rather than 
Officer Call requested that the defendant make the purchase 
of marijuana (Tr.42). 
On two other occasions between October 30 and 
November 4, 1974, Officer Call again contacted defendant, 
this time without Terrell Eady, and asked him whether he or 
his contact had additional marijuana for sale. His reply 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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on both occasions was simply, "no, my contact does not have 
any." Defendant made no expression of an unwillingness to 
sell (Tr.5). 
Officer Call returned to defendant's apartment, 
again alone, on November 5, 19 74. This time in response to 
a like inquiry, defendant, without being entreated to do so, 
joined Officer Call in his car and led him to an Ogden 
residence. At this residence, defendant did sell Officer 
Call marijuana (Tr.37,38). 
On the following day, November 6, 1974, a complaint 
alleging distribution of marijuana for value and referring to 
the October 29, 1974, incident was signed by the Weber County 
Attorney and filed with the City Clerk. Shortly thereafter, 
County Attorney Prosecutor Robert Wallace, and attorney for 
defense William Marsh, entered into plea negotiations regarding 
the purchases occurring on October 29, 1974, and November 5, 
1974 (Tr.79). Pursuant to those negotiations, defendant plead 
guilty to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana, a Class 
"B" Misdemeanor (Tr.79). However, on February 19, 1975, the 
date set for sentencing, defendant made an oral request to with-
draw his plea of guilty (Tp.20). On April 2, 1975, defendant 
was allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty, entered pursuant 
to the above mentioned negotiations (Tp.20). 
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Following defendant's withdrawal of his guilty 
plea, he made motion to dismiss the State's action on grounds 
of entrapment. One day later, on May 22, 1975, after 
reevaluation of the two purchases, the State decided to 
dismiss the complaint alleging distribution for value on , 
October 29, 1974, and filed a new complaint alleging the facts 
arising out of the November 5, 1974, purchase (Tp.20). The 
prosecutor responsible for the dismissal of the October * 
29th charge and filing of the November 5th complaint testified 
at defendant's trial that this was done because the county 
attorney's office believed the second purchase on November 5, i 
1974, was a stronger case for the State (Tr.87). ^ 
On May 29, 1975, the date set for trial, the first 
complaint was dismissed and the second complaint was filed. \ 
Summons on the second complaint was not served on defendant at 
that time because of representations made by the defense that 
defendant would be out of the country for the summer (Tp.21). < 
The State became aware of defendant's presence in 
this country on July 3, 1975, when defendant was picked up and 
arrested on charges of possession of a controlled substance ^ 
(Tp.21). At the time of defendant's arraignment on the charge 
of possession the Weber County Attorney's Office had him 
arraigned on the complaint charging distribution for value, ' 
occurring on November 5, 1974. 
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At arraignment in district court on the second 
prosecution, appellant moved to dismiss, raising the defenses 
of (1) entrapment, (2) double jeopardy, and (3) denial of 
speedy trial (R.9-10). Defendant's motion to dismiss 
the information was denied (R.30). 
Defendant's case was then set for a jury trial on 
January 27, 1976. Defendant then waived his right to a jury 
trial (Minute Entry, R.36). 
On the day of the trial defendant appeared and 
moved the court for an order compelling the State to produce 
Terrell Eady as a witness for defendant. The court denied 
the motion and ordered the case to trial* 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court judge 
found defendant guilty of distribution not for value. The 
trial judge stated that he was not satisfied that defendant 
was guilty of distributing a controlled substance for value 
but was satisfied that defendant stood ready and willing to 
distribute not for value. The trial judge therefore 
found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense (Tr.102). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
APPELLANT GUILTY OF DISTRIBUTION NOT FOR 
VALUE. 
Appellant was charged with distributing a controlled 
substance for value. In a non-jury trial, Judge Wahlquist Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter L w Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after hearing evidence from both defense and prosecution, 
found appellant guilty of distributing a controlled 
substance, not for value. Distributing not for values is 
a lesser included offense of the crime of distributing for 
value. In so finding, Judge Wahlguist stated the following: 
"Insofar as the facts of the 
crime are concerned, the court believes 
that what has occurred is this: The 
court believes that the defendant stood 
ready, willing, and able to share with < 
others possession and use and division 
of marijuana. 
The court is not convinced that 
he was necessarily in a position or 
made a habit of selling marijuana." 
(Tr.102). 1 
Stated simply, the trial judge in this case did 
not find the State's evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict 
of guity as to the major offense, distributing for value. < 
The trial judge did, however, find the evidence sufficient to 
support a verdict of guilty as to the lesser included offense. 
Appellant contends that the trial judge found ^ 
appellant not guilty of the major offense because of entrap-
ment and guilty of the lesser offense because it found entrap-
ment to be only a "partial defense." ' 
Appellant bases this argument on the following 
observation made by Judge Wahlquist: 
"The court believes that entrap- * 
ment may operate through instrumentalities 
or other persons that the conduct of Eddie 
is such that under the objective standard, 
it might take one who is willing to distribute 
mariiuana not for sale and cause them to 
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be involved in a valued distribution. 
In other words, I believe in this 
case entrapment is a partial defense. 
It may have a tendency of increasing the 
nature of the crime, for this reason 
the court finds him guilty, not guilty 
of entrapment insofar as the major offense 
is concerned because of entrapment, but 
finds that the conduct of entrapment, but 
finds that the conduct of entrapment in 
no way entrapped him into sharing possession 
and making division of marijuana. For 
that reason I find him guilty of the lesser 
offense of distributing not for value." 
(Tr.102,103). 
Respondent's understanding of Judge Wahlquist's 
statement concerning entrapment is this. Judge Wahlquist 
found appellant guilty of distributing marijuana not for 
value but found that appellant would not have distributed for 
value had it not been for Officer Call's providing the money 
and making the request. The trial court therefore felt that 
appellant was entrapped into distributing for value but not 
entrapped into distributing not for value. 
Appellant argues, however, that any finding of 
entrapment compels the trial court to dismiss the case with 
prejudice. This position is not supported by statute. 
In the chapter on entrapment, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-303 (1977), subsections (4) and (5) read as 
follows: 
-7-
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"(4) Upon written motion of 
the defendant, the court shall hear 
evidence on the issue and shall 
determine as a matter of fact and 
law whether the defendant was entrapped 
to commit the offense. Defendant's 
motion shall be made at least ten days 
before trial except the court for good 
cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine 
that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but 
if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented 
by the defendant to the jury at trial. 
Any order by the court dismissing a case 
based on entrapment shall be appealable 
by the state." 
Subsections (4) and (5) provide that the trial 
court, upon defendant's motion, shall hear evidence on the 
issue of entrapment. Should the trial court at that time 
determine that defendant was entrapped, the case should be 
dismissed with prejudice. Should the court find that 
defendant was not entrapped the case should go to trial, 
at which time evidence of entrapment may still be admitted 
for consideration by the trier of fact. Should the trier 
of fact find entrapment at trial, the statute does not 
require a dismissal of the case. 
In the present case, defendant, prior to tirial, 
was granted an evidentiary hearing to consider his motion 
to dismiss. Defendant's motion properly raised the defense 
of entrapment. Judge Gould, presiding over the evidentiary 
hearing, found as a matter of law and fact that defendant 
-8-
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had not been entrapped into distributing for value. Had 
Judge Gould found entrapment at that time, the case would 
have been dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendant's case was then tried in a non-jury 
trial before Judge Wahlquist. Judge Wahlquist, the trier 
of fact, listened to evidence concerning the defense of 
entrapment, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(5) 
(1977). After hearing all the evidence Judge Wahlquist 
found appellant not guilty of distribution for value, 
because of entrapment, and guilty of distribution not 
for value, finding no entrapment to have been involved. 
Judge Wahlquistfs determination that appellant 
^ would not have distributed for value had he not been 
entrapped did not, according to the statute, mandate that 
the case be dismissed. 
Judge Wahlquist was authorized in finding appellant 
guilty of the lesser included offense of distributing not 
for value, provided there was no entrapment involved in 
appellantfs non-valued distribution. 
This was Judge Wahlquist1s conclusion as is 
evidenced by the statement: 
". . . [The court] finds that the 
conduct of entrapment in no way entrapped 
him into sharing possession and making 
division of marijuana. For that reason 
I find him guilty of the lesser offense 
of distributing not for value." (Tr.l03)# Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY. 
Appellant entered a plea of "once in jeopardy" 
at his arraignment, on the charge of distribution for 
value occurring on November 5, 1974, and moved for the 
court to dismiss the action (R.9-10,23-29). The motion 
was denied. 
Appellant distributed a controlled substance 
to Officer Call on two separate occasions* The first 
distribution occurred on October 29r 1974, in the presence 
i 
of Terrell Eady. The second distribution occurred on 
November 5, 1974, a full week later, Officer Call being alone. 
The Weber County Prosecutor after initially charging 
1 
appellant with the October 29th offense, dismissed that case 
and filed the November 5th case against appellant, the 
second case being the stronger of the two. 
i 
The October 29th case was dismissed before appellant 
was brought to trial, before a jury had been empaneled, and 
before a decision had been reached concerning appellant's 
i 
motion to dismiss the October 29th charge because of 
entrapment. 
Appellant contends that the dismissal by the 
prosecution of the October 29th distribution for value case 
-1 n-
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and subsequent prosecution of the November 5th distribution 
for value case constituted double jeopardy. 
Collateral estoppel or double jeopardy as it is 
referred to in criminal cases, State v. Pruitt, 531 P.2d 
860, 862 (Kan, 1975), is a federal and state constitutional 
protection against putting a person in jeopardy twice for the 
same offense. People v. Smith, 512 P.2d 269f 272 (Colo. 
1973). Appellant's claim of double jeopardy applies not to 
one single offense but to two separate and distinct 
offenses, and therefore the protection against double 
jeopardy does not apply. 
That appellant's distribution of a controlled 
substance on two different occasions constituted two 
separate offenses is supported by the decision of this 
Court in State v. Dolan, 502 P.2d 549 (Utah 1972). In 
that case, defendant plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge 
of writing a bad check on August 16f 1971. Defendant was 
also later convicted of two felony charges for writing bad 
checks on July 22, 1971, and August 3, 14 and 15, 1971. All 
of these bad check writings were known to the prosecution 
at the time defendant plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge 
of writing a bad check. Defendant appealed from the felony 
conviction, claiming double jeopardy. The Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that there was no double jeopardy in that 
case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Disherson v. State, 518 P.2d 892 (1974 Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals), the defendant claimed that his 
alleged act of distributing marijuana to undercover 
agents on four different occasions constituted one offense 
and therefore the act of trying him on more than one 
charge constituted double jeopardy. In finding no double 
jeopardy, the Oklahoma Court stated: 
"After carefully reviewing the 
record in the three cases in which 
he was convicted, we are of the 
opinion that each sale was a separate 
and distinct offense and find this 
proposition to be without merit." 
Id. at 895. 
Respondent argues that appellantfs distribution of 
marijuana on October 29, 1974, and November 5, 1974, consti-
tuted two separate offenses and therefore the protection of 
not being placed in jeopardy twice for a single offense 
does not apply. 
Even if this Court concluded that appellant's two 
separate distributions of a controlled substance constituted 
a single offense, double jeopardy would not attach until 
a jury is empaneled" or if it is a non-jury trial, the actual 
trial of the case has begun. This was the ruling of this 
Court in the case of Boyer v. Larson, 433 P.2d 1015, 1016 
(1967). In the case of Serf ass v. United States,. 95 S.Ct. 1055 
(1975), which stands for the same principle as enunciated in 
Boyer v. Larson, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"As an aid to the decision of 
cases in which the prohibition of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause has been 
invoked, the courts have found it 
useful to define a point in criminal 
proceedings at which the constitutional 
purposes and policies are implicated 
by resort to the concept of 'attachment 
of jeopardy.1 . . . In the case of a 
jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a 
jury is empaneled and sworn, . • In a 
nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when 
the court begins to hear evidence. . . 
The Court has consistently adhered to 
the view that jeopardy does not attachf 
and the constitutional prohibition can 
have no applicationf until a defendant 
is 'put to trial before the trier of facts9 
whether the trier be a jury or a judge.1" 
Id. at 1062. 
In the present case, the record shows that the 
case was dismissed by the prosecution prior to either an 
empaneling of a jury or an actual trial before a trial 
court judge. Double jeopardy therefore could not have 
attached in the present case. 
Appellant relies on Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S.Ct. 1189 
(1970), to support his contentions that double jeopardy 
occurred in this case. Ashe v. Swensonf supra, states that 
collateral estoppel is applied when an issue of ultimate 
fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment. 
Appellant does not contend that a valid and final judgment 
was reached in the first case brought against appellant. 
It is clear from the record that no judgment whatsoever was 
.1 0__ 
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made. Respondent urges this Court to affirm the trial 
court's denial of appellant's double jeopardy claim on the 
basis that the two distributions constituted separate 
offenses and that double jeopardy had not attached at the 
time the first case brought against appellant was dismissed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ORDER THE STATE TO 
PRODUCE TERRELL EADY AS A WITNESS. 
Appellant claims that the trial court in refusing 
his motion for compulsory process denied him a fair trial. 
The witness appellant sought to have testify at
 ( 
his trial was one Terrell Eady. As has been stated, Mr. 
Eadyf formerly a black student at Weber State College, 
assisted Officer Call in contacting appellant and was j 
present on October 29, 1974, when appellant distributed 
marijuana to Officer Call (Tr.42). Mr. Eady was not present, 
however, on November 5, 1974, when the crime for which < 
appellant has been convicted occurred (Tr.37,38). 
Prior to trial on the October 29, 1974, distribution 
charge a hearing on the issue of entrapment was held. Mr. { 
Eady testified as a witness for appellant in that hearing 
(Tp.24). Following the hearing, Weber County Prosecutor 
Robert Wallace chose to dismiss the October 29th charge against 4 
appellant. 
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Mr. Wallace took the stand at appellant's 
trial and in response to counsel for appellant's question, 
concerning his reasons for dismissing the first case and 
prosecuting the second, stated: 
"So tactically I felt the second 
case to be stronger and plus the fact 
that you have the evidence of the 
first case to show some previous 
position or some earlier contact with 
the defendant, and so I decided that 
it would be better tactically to 
proceed on one trial." (Tr.87). 
The State dismissed the October 29th charge 
of distribution and prosecuted the November 5th distribution 
for the simple tactical reason that their November 5th case 
was stronger. 
On the day of appellant's trial on the November 5th 
charge, appellant's counsel moved the court for an order 
compelling the State to produce Mr. Eady as a witness (Tr.3). 
After hearing argument on both sides concerning the relevance 
of Mr. Eady's testimony, the court denied appellant's motion 
for compulsory process but reserved the right to continue the 
trial or dismiss the case if it appeared appellant was 
prejudiced by this ruling (Tr.ll). Neither a continuance 
nor a dismissal was issued by the trial court and the denial 
of appellant's motion was left standing. 
At the trial, appellant's counsel claimed that he 
had made extensive efforts to locate Mr. Eady, but was unable 
-15-
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to do so. Weber County prosecutor Mr. Wallace testified 
at trial that the fact that Mr. Eady was on probation 
would make it relatively simple to find him (Tr.89) „ 
That Mr. Eady was on probation was a fact which the defense 
counsel easily could have ascertained* 
Respondent contends that appellant in this case 
is requesting that the court subpoena a witness whomi 
defendant himself could have subpoened. 
With reference to this matter, the Washington 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Smith, 540 P.2d 424 
(1975), stated: 
"Under court rules, appellant 
could himself have subpoenaed the 
broadcaster. CrR 4.8, CR 45(a)(1). 
This he chose not to do. Under 
these circumstances a request to the 
trial court to issue a subpoena is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court, and an adverse decision thereupon 
will be overturned only on a showing of 
prejudice." 3^ d. at 433-434. 
In the present case the trial court exercised its 
discretion in refusing appellant compulsory process. 
Respondent argues that the trial court's position should 
only be disturbed by a showing of prejudice. This position 
is supported by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
case of United States v. Lepiscopo, 458 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 
1972). The Court in upholding the trial court's decision 
to refuse appellant compulsory process stated: 
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"In his appeal pro se the 
appellant claims that he was denied 
his right to compulsory process. He 
requested several witnessesf five of 
these were denied by the trial judge. 
Two of those denied were expert witnesses 
from Atlanta, Georgia, where the appellant 
had been imprisoned prior to transfer to 
Leavenworth; the remainder were inmates 
at other federal prisons. Rule 17(b) 
Fed.R.Crim.P. provides that witnesses 
will be subpoenaed at government expense 
•upon a satisfactory showing that the 
defendant is financially unable to pay 
the fees of the witness and that the 
presence of the witness is necessary to 
an adequate defense.1 A motion to have 
a witness produced at government expense 
is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the court and is not an absolute right. 
. . . . These witnesses were to tesitfy on 
the insanity issue. None of them had seen 
or talked to the defendant for over a year 
prior to the offense. The court justifiably 
ruled that their testimony was not necessary 
to an adequate defense. There was no abuse 
of discretion by the trial judge." IcL at 
978. 
In the present case, appellant failed at the time 
of trial to show the materiality of Mr. Eady as a witness. 
Appellant also fails now on appeal to show prejudice resulting 
from Mr. Eady's failing to testify. 
Mr. Eady was not in appellant's or Officer Call's 
presence on November 5, 1974, when appellant voluntarily 
distributed a controlled substance to Officer Call. What 
-17-
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testimony Mr. Eady had to give pertained to the October 
29th offense, Mr. Eady's testimony was immaterial as to the 
November 5th offense, his having had nothing to do with 
the dealings between appellant and Officer Call on that day. 
This was the sound decision of the trial court. 
Even if this Court should find that Mr. Eadyfs 
testimony was material, respondent contends that the 
court's refusal to invoke compulsory process constituted 
harmless error in that the substance of Mr. Eady's 
testimony given at pretrial hearing on the October 29th 
charge was allowed in as hearsay evidence without objection 
through the testimony of County Prosecutor Robert Wallace 
(Tp.25). 
Respondent argues that because Mr. Eady's 
testimony that appellant was unwilling to distribute and 
was basically entrapped into committing the offense was 
allowed in as evidence appellant was neither harmed nor 
prejudiced by Mr. Eady's not testifying. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND SPEEDY 
TRIAL. 
Appellant claims that the prosecution intentionally 
delayed his trial for the purpose of preventing appellant \ 
from calling Terrell Eady as a witness. Appellantfs claim 
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is not supported by the record. 
Shortly after the commission of the offense for 
which appellant has been convicted, the State entered into 
a plea negotiation with appellant. The State agreed not 
to prosecute the November 5, 1974, distribution offense 
and to reduce the October 29, 1974, offense to a misdemeanor 
charge of possession if appellant would agree to plead guilty 
to the misdemeanor charge (Tp.20). Appellant plead guilty, 
but later was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The court 
approved appellantfs guilty plea withdrawal on April 2, 19 75, 
approximately six months after the commission of the offense. 
(Tp.20). The record establishes that appellant's tactics 
with reference to the plea bargaining agreement caused a 
six months' delay in the State's prosecution of this case. 
The record further establishes that appellant and his 
counsel knew that the State intended to prosecute appellant 
on one if not both of the distribution offenses occurring 
in October and November. 
Following the breakdown in the plea bargaining 
agreement, the State began the prosecution anew and chose 
to prosecute appellant on the October 29, 1974, distribution 
offense. Trial on that case was set for May 29, 1975. As they 
neared that date, County Prosecutor Robert Wallace decided 
that the State should prosecute appellant on just one offense 
rather than on both the October 29th and November 5th offenses Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Wallace also testified that because the 
November 5th case was the stronger of the two, the State 
decided to drop the October 29th case and prosecute 
appellant on the November 5f 1974, offense (Tr.86,87). 
Mr. Wallace further testified that the 
State's plan v/as made known to appellant's counsel (Tp.23). 
A new complaint against appellant alleging the November 5th 
offense was then filed prior to the May 29, 1976, trial 
d a t e . ' '"••:•• 
A warrant was not issued for appellant's arrest 
at that time, however, as the State did not feel it was 
necessary, and was under the impression from appellant's 
counsel that appellant would be out of the Country during 
the summer (Tp.21). Appellant's presence in Weber County 
became known when he was picked up on a possession of 
marijuana charge in Ogden. The State then had appellant 
arraigned, on the November 5, 1974, distribution offense. 
Appellant's case then proceeded through its normal course 
to trial. The record establishes that the Weber County 
Prosecutor's Office dealt with appellant in an open and 
honest manner. This was also the finding of the trial judge. 
At the conclusion of appellant's trial, Judge 
Wahlquist made the following findings of fact: 
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"THE COURT: The court finds 
the facts to be as follows: First 
of all the court believes that 
the dismissal of the one and the 
filing of a new one is done in good 
faith and for reasons of strategy. 
What Mr. Wallace has said about his 
intent and reasons are true statements 
and he has not falsefied to the court 
in this regard. What he has said is 
true." (Tr.102). 
The Statefs trial tactics were exercised in good 
faith and for reasons of strategy. Appellant's claim 
that the prosecution's tactics denied him a fair and 
speedy trial is unfounded. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
Under Utah lawf a defendant may waive his right 
to trial by jury. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953), as 
amended, provides that " . . . waiver shall be made in open 
court and entered in the minutes." 
The minutes of the court in this case state on 
page 36 of the record: "Defendant waived his right to 
trial by jury." This minute entry was recorded on January 
27, 1976, the day of appellant's trial. (R.36). 
Appellant contends now on appeal that he did not 
waive his right to trial by jury and that the record is 
insufficient to support the fact that he did waive a jury 
trial. 
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Respondent argues that the Court's minute entry 
is sufficient to support the fact that appellant did waive 
his right to trial by jury. 
I n
 Bush v. Bush, 150 P.2d 168 (1944), the Supreme 
Court of Kansas said the following concerning the validity 
of the court's minutes: 
"The minutes of the trial court 
may be presumed to be a trustworthy 
chronicle of events as they transpired 
at trial, and that they are competent 
and ordinarily controlling on the 
question of what order was in fact 
made/ Id. at 170. 
The validity of the court1s minutes was also 
enunciated in an Oklahoma case under facts similar to those 
in the present case. In Smith v. State, 429 P.2d 533 (Court 
of Criminal Appeals, Oklahoma 19 67), petitioner Smith in 
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus contended that 
he had been denied the representation of counsel at every 
stage of his proceedings. The minute entry of the court 
showed that appellant had waived his right to an attorney and 
knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the minute entry 
to be sufficient to establish the fact that appellant had 
waived his right to counsel. In so finding, the Court held: 
-22-
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"It has been repeatedly held 
where a dispute arises as to the 
trial procedure, the minutes of the 
court are the best evidence of what 
transpired," IcL at 534. 
In the case before this Court, the best evidence 
of what transpired at appellant's trial is the minutes 
of the court, and the minutes state that appellant waived 
his right to trial by jury. 
Arguing in the alternative, respondent contends 
that even without the court record stating that appellant 
waived his right to a jury trial, appellant should be estopped 
from raising the issue now on appeal* 
In reviewing the application of Jay Banshbach, for a 
writ of habeas corpus or writ of review, 323 P.2d 1112 (Mont* 
1958), the Montana Supreme Court stated: 
"Of course, if accused proceeds 
to trial without making his desires 
for a jury known, then he waives a 
jury trial under the rule stated in 
Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okl.Cr. 322, 
188 P.2d 367, and Ex parte Guisti, 
51 Nev. 105, 269 P. 600. In other 
words, he is not permitted to gamble on 
the outcome before the judge without a 
jury and then if dissatisfied make a 
belated demand for a jury." Id. at 1114-1115. 
Appellantfs counsel in this case allowed the non-jury 
trial to proceed without objection or claim that appellant 
desired a trial by jury. Counsel for appellant after gambling 
that they would win their case in a non-jury trial, now attempts 
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to raise the issue of a non-jury trial on appeal. 
To allow appellant to induce error on the part 
of the trial court for the purpose of having that issue 
to raise on appeal, is to allow appellant to abuse the 
trial court for his benefit. Appellant should be 
estopped from abusing the trial court in this manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The Weber County Attorney's Office dealt with 
appellant in an open and honest manner as determined by 
the trial court. The record establishes that appellant 
was given a fair trial and afforded the constitutional 
protections guaranteed him. For the reasons stated in 
this brief, respondent urges this Court to sustain 
„ i appellant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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